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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this research is to determine the optimal rating philosophy for the 
rating of SMEs, and to describe the consequences of the chosen philosophy on several 
related aspects. As to our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies the 
considerations of financial institutions on what rating philosophy to adopt for specific 
portfolios. 
 
The importance for banks to have a solid risk framework to predict credit risk of their 
counterparties is well reflected by the quality and the quantity of research on this 
subject. Moreover, a good risk framework is vital to become compliant with the new 
Basel II framework.  
 
Problem is that financial institutions nearly always neglect the first step in the rating 
model development process: the determination of the rating philosophy. It is very 
important for financial institutions to decide whether they want their internal rating 
systems to grade borrowers according to their current condition (point-in-time), or 
their expected condition over a cycle and in stress (through-the-cycle), because the 
rating philosophy influences many aspects such as: credit approval, pricing, credit and 
portfolio monitoring, the regulatory and internal capital requirements and the 
competitive position of a bank. This makes the question which rating philosophy to 
use very important.  
 
Moreover, many different modelling techniques exist to determine credit risk, but few 
attempts have been devoted to credit risk assessment of small commercial loans, 
although SME exposures are relatively important for European banks. SMEs have 
specific characteristics that influence the rating philosophy and therefore the 
development and use of credit risk models. These SME characteristics are taken into 
account in the analysis to determine the optimal rating philosophy. 
 
 
Keywords:  rating philosophy, small business, Basel II, credit rating, banks  
 
JEL classification codes: D82, E32, G20, G28, G33   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to give insight in the considerations of financial 
institutions1 on what rating philosophy to adopt for specific portfolios.  
One of the highest risks a bank faces is the risk that one of the bank’s 
counterparties goes into default, not repaying interest and/or principal. A solid 
framework for measuring credit risk is therefore of the utmost importance for a bank 
to manage and control its credit risks properly. The importance for banks to have a 
solid risk framework to predict credit risk of their counterparties is well reflected by 
the quality and the quantity of research on this subject. 
Moreover, a good risk framework is vital to become compliant with the new 
Basel II framework. The Basel II IRB approach requires banks to have an internal 
measure of credit risk, to determine the probability of default (PD) of their clients. 
Banks capital requirements are based on their own assessment of the PD of individual 
borrowers. However, most banks have difficulties in establishing credible and reliable 
estimates of their risk factors. 
A problem is that financial institutions nearly always neglect the first step in 
the rating model development process: the determination of the rating philosophy. It is 
very important for financial institutions to understand whether they want their internal 
rating systems to be point-in-time oriented (PIT), through-the-cycle (TTC) oriented, or 
follow a mixed approach, in other words the kind of information they want the rating 
to summarize. Without knowing this, it is difficult either to interpret the results of 
backtesting, or to assess what will happen to the capital requirements during an 
economic cycle. However only few financial institutions seem to clearly have made a 
choice (Bank of Japan, 2005). Some financial institutions have bought external rating 
models, for example Moody’s RiskCalcTM. Also when using external vendor models, 
banks should be aware of their rating philosophy, whether their rating models match 
with the (pre)defined philosophy, and what the consequences are of using a model 
with a specific philosophical basis.    
The rating philosophy is the view of a financial institution how rating 
assignments are affected by the bank’s choice of the range of economic, business and 
industry conditions that are considered in the rating process (FED, 2006).  
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In PIT ratings, risks are evaluated based on the current condition of a firm 
regardless of the phase of the business cycle at the time of evaluation (Bank of Japan, 
2005). TTC ratings look through temporary changes in credit risk, regardless of 
whether they are aggregate, industry or firm specific in nature.  
They indicate the ability of a firm to survive through the business and 
economic cycle, or the life of the loan.  
 
• The rating philosophy is of key importance as it affects: 
• Rating volatility; 
• Internal rating model power and quality; 
• Pricing; 
• Early warning of defaults; 
• Calculations of expected and unexpected losses; 
• Regulatory and internal capital requirements; 
• Validation, backtesting and stress testing; 
• The competitive position of a bank. 
 
Moreover, many different modelling techniques exist to determine credit risk, 
but few attempts have been devoted to credit risk assessment of small commercial 
loans, although SME exposures are a relatively high share of bank loan portfolios for 
European banks. Because rating agencies do not provide SME ratings, financial 
institutions must develop (or buy) rating models to determine the credit risk of these 
counterparties. SMEs have specific characteristics that influence the rating philosophy 
and therefore the development and use of credit risk models. Small firms are 
informationally opaque (Peterson, 1999), volatile, and the relatively small size of each 
loan implies that since lenders face fixed costs in lending, lending to small firms is by 
definition more expensive. The lack of data has made SME credit risk an 
underresearched area in finance. There are only a few studies on PD estimation 
specifically for SMEs, for example an article by Edminster (1972), a paper by Altman 
and Sabato (2005), and Moody’s RiskCalcTM (Falkenstein, Boral and Carty, 2000). 
The objective of this research is to determine the optimal rating philosophy for 
the rating of SMEs by financial institutions, and to describe the consequences of the 
chosen philosophy on several related aspects.  
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As to our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies the considerations of 
financial institutions on what rating philosophy to adopt for specific portfolios. Most 
papers on rating philosophy focus on the rating philosophy of rating agencies, while 
this paper focuses on the rating philosophy of financial institutions. The closest work 
is of Taylor (2003), the Financial Services Authority (2005) and Catarineu-Rabell, 
Jackson and Tsomocos (2003).  
The other goals of this research are: to give insight in the rating philosophy 
concept, and to provide an extensive overview of the characteristics of SMEs that 
influence the rating philosophy. These specific SME characteristics are taken into 
account in the analysis to determine the optimal rating philosophy.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next sections, credit 
risk (2), rating philosophy (3) and the characteristics of SMEs that influence the rating 
philosophy (4) are described. Then, the analysis of the optimal rating philosophy for 
SMEs (5) and the consequences are presented (6). The paper ends with a summary and 
some concluding remarks (7). 
 
 
2. CREDIT RISK 
 
2.1 Credit risk 
Credit risk is the risk that those who borrow money from a bank do not pay 
back interest and/or principal in a timely manner or at all. Credit risk consists of three 
components: 
 
• Probability of default (PD): the probability of a default, during a given 
period of time (assessment period). Default means not receiving interest 
and principal as specified in the debt agreement.  
• Credit exposure (EAD): the outstanding obligation when the default 
occurs. 
• Recovery rate (RR): the fraction of the exposure that may be recovered in 
the event of a default. The loss given default (LGD) is one minus the 
recovery rate.  
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Each of the above items is critical for determining credit risk. The PD is most 
important, but also most difficult to determine. Prior to default, there is no way to 
discriminate unambiguously between firms that will default and those that won’t 
during the next year(s). At best a probabilistic assessment of the probability of default 
can be made. 
Under the revised Basel framework, the IRB approach requires banks to 
estimate the PD of all their clients. The PD is used for the calculation of the regulatory 
capital requirements. Basel II uses the following definition for the probability of 
default. “The PD is the probability that a borrower meets the default definition within 
one year, expressed as a percentage. A default is considered to have occurred with 
regard to a particular obligor when either or both of the following events have taken 
place: 
 
• The obligor is 90 days past due on any material credit obligation to the 
banking group; 
• The obligor is unlikely to pay its credit obligations to the banking group” 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). 
 
PD’s can be stressed or unstressed. Stressed PD’s give an indication of the 
likelihood of default, assuming adverse stress-scenario economic conditions. 
Unstressed PD’s are unbiased estimates of the probability of default.  
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2.2 Credit Risk models 
To measure credit risk (PD) on individual banks loans, banks use credit risk 
models, also called rating or credit scoring models. Rating is a process of classifying 
exposures into different grades that indicate the ability and willingness of 
counterparties to pay. Each grade matches with a PD range. For the development of 
internal rating models to measure the probability of default, several methodologies or 
techniques exist:  
 
• Statistical models (neural networks and multivariate credit scoring models 
such as discriminant analysis (Altman, 1968) and logistic regression); 
• Hybrid models (models that combine expert knowledge and statistics); 
• Expert judgement. 
 
Different kinds of obligors require different rating models. SME business is 
riskier than large corporate lending (Altman and Sabato, 2005). SMEs support a risk 
premium on their indebtness; mainly because of the lack on information on the risk 
they represent (Rivaud-Danset, Dubocage and Salais, 1998). As a consequence, banks 
should develop credit risk models specifically addressed to SMEs, in order to 
minimize their expected and unexpected losses. For privately held firms with no 
market data available, accounting-based statistical credit scoring methods are the most 
common approach.  
 
 2.3 Credit risk modelling process 
The credit risk modelling process contains of three main activities, as 
displayed in figure 1. Basel II is a precondition in this process. The rating philosophy 
is the starting point. The rating philosophy influences the rating systems design, and 
therefore the ratings systems, and the rating system use. Because of this, it is very 
important to first decide on the rating philosophy, before developing (or buying) rating 
systems.  
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
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3 RATING PHILOSOPHY 
3.1 Rating Philosophy 
A rating philosophy is how the bank's obligor rating assignments are affected 
by the bank's choice of the range of economic, business, and industry conditions that 
are considered in the rating process (FED, 2006). A rating philosophy is the expected 
behaviour with respect to the economic and industry cycles. The rating philosophy 
indicates the nature of the rating, i.e. what kind of information the rating intends to 
summarize (Löffler, 2004). The time horizon of assessing the creditworthiness of 
borrowers in assigning ratings is part of the rating philosophy. 
 
Rating system approaches may be characterized as being on a spectrum 
between:  
 
• Point-in-time (PIT) approaches; 
• Through-the-cycle (TTC) approaches. 
 
The choice for a specific rating philosophy is a trade-off between: 
 
• Quality; do the ratings give a right indication of the probability of default? 
• Timeliness; are the ratings based on the current situation of the company? 
• Volatility; how often do the ratings migrate? 
 
3.2 Basel II requirements 
“A bank needs to specify its rating philosophy, that is, how the bank’s 
wholesale obligor rating assignments are affected by the bank’s choice of the range of 
economic, business, and industry conditions that are considered in the obligor rating 
process. The philosophical basis of a bank’s ratings system is important because, when 
combined with the credit quality of individual obligors, it will determine the frequency 
of obligor rating changes in a changing economic environment.  
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Rating systems that rate obligors based on their ability to perform over a wide 
range of economic, business, and industry conditions, sometimes described as 
“through-the-cycle” systems, would tend to have ratings that migrate more slowly as 
conditions change. Banks that rate obligors based on a more narrow range of likely 
expected conditions (primarily on recent conditions), sometimes called “point-in-
time” systems, would tend to have ratings that migrate more frequently. Many banks 
will rate obligors using an approach that considers a combination of the current 
conditions and a wider range of other likely conditions. In any case, the bank would 
need to specify the rating philosophy used and establish a policy for the migration of 
obligors from one rating grade to another in response to economic cycles. A bank 
should understand the effects of ratings migration on its risk-based capital 
requirements and ensure that sufficient capital is maintained during all phases of the 
economic cycle” (FED, 2006). 
 
3.3 Point-in-time 
In the point-in-time (PIT) rating method, risks are evaluated based on the 
current condition of a firm regardless of the phase of the business cycle at the time of 
evaluation. A PIT PD is unstressed. PIT rating systems take all cyclical and non-
cyclical, systematic and obligor specific information into account. The essential 
feature of a PIT rating system is that it aims explicitly to forecast default probability 
over a set period, typically one year (Financial Services Authority, 2005).  
Under a 100% PIT system, the rating changes as soon as the borrower’s 
condition changes. Obligors are constantly assigned to new ratings whose PDs reflect 
the forward looking default likelihood, based on the best available information about 
their current credit quality. PIT systems are defined by current PD’s that reflect the 
current creditworthiness of the counterparty. 
In case of perfect models, defaults actually experienced should match the 
predicted defaults every year. Under a PIT system, the risk rating to the PD mapping 
is kept constant. A PIT system can be defined by volatile ratings, due to frequent 
rating migrations, but constant PDs per rating grade. Ex-post default rates per grade 
are stable regardless of the business cycle (Bank of Japan, 2005). 
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PIT rating systems are cyclical and forward-looking. In general, PIT ratings 
tend to rise during economic upturns, as most obligors’ creditworthiness improves and 
tend to fall during economic downturns.   
 
3.4 Through-the-cycle 
In literature, there is no consensus on what is precisely meant by TTC.  
In this research TTC is defined as a measure of the ability of an obligor to 
remain solvent at the trough of a business or economic cycle or during severe stress 
events (Treacy and Carey, 2000). This means that risk default rates are estimated for a 
borrower’s conditions at the bottom of the economic or industry cycle and under 
stress. In case the life of the loan is shorter than the economic or business cycle, the 
term of the loan is used.  
The ratings are based on a variety of longer-run considerations, financial and 
non-financial, quantitative and qualitative. The TTC rating methodology requires a 
separation of permanent and cyclical components in default risk. The essential feature 
of a TTC system is that it seeks to produce ratings that do not vary with cyclical 
movements (a cyclical), although the ratings of individual companies will fluctuate 
due to changes in their own position and prospects. TTC ratings only respond to 
permanent shocks to the firm, transitory shocks are ignored (Löffler, 2004).  
In TTC rating, the rating grades of firms remain the same through the business 
cycle, but ex-post default rates within the same grade fluctuate reflecting the business 
cycle (Bank of Japan, 2005). A TTC system can be defined by stable ratings but 
realised PDs per rating grade vary over the cycle.  
The rating agencies, such as Moody’s and S&P, follow a TTC rating approach; 
agency ratings are assigned based on an estimate of the borrowers default probability 
in a stress scenario.  
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3.5 Differences between PIT and TTC ratings 
Pure TTC or PIT systems do not exist in practice in the commercial world 
(Financial Services Authority, 2005). It is not possible to include all information in a 
rating, as is required in a PIT rating, simply because not all information is available to 
a bank, due to information asymmetry and information that is not sufficiently forward 
looking. Besides, there might be resistance from account managers to downgrade 
certain obligors too quickly. It is also not possible to exactly know what the worst 
conditions are in a cycle and to simulate these, and to split all information in cycle or 
company specific, as should be done under the TTC approach. However, ratings 
systems can be very close to true TTC or PIT systems. 
 
Volatility 
The extend to which banks need to downgrade borrowers during a recession, 
depends for a large part on the way the PD is determined. TTC rating systems tend to 
have ratings that migrate slowly as conditions change. The PDs arising from a TTC 
system will be stable and cyclically neutral. TTC systems have a clear advantage in 
preventing the regulatory and internal capital requirements becoming procyclical.  
PIT rating systems that rate obligors on a more narrow range of expected 
conditions (both permanent and transitory shocks), tend to have ratings that migrate 
more frequently. Under a PIT philosophy the PDs assigned to individual obligors are 
volatile and can be expected to move counter-cyclically, see figure 2.   
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
Quality and timeliness 
There are two types of rating errors. A type I error means classifying a firm as 
not likely to default, when it actually does default, i.e. a false positive. A type II error 
means classifying a firm as likely to default when it does not default. Both errors 
create different types of economic costs for a firm.  
Insert Table 1 About Here 
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The more PIT the PDs are, the more forward looking and thus predictive they 
are. In case of a PIT rating system, there is a risk that a company wrongly is seen as 
risky (type II error), because all information is included in the rating. 
Under a TTC or hybrid (PIT/TTC) approach, a borrower's rating grade won't 
be fully sensitive to factors affecting the likelihood of the company defaulting in the 
next 12 months, such as whether the industry may be at or approaching a cyclical 
peak. Some risk sensitivity is rejected because up-to-date information is not used. 
Under a TTC rating system, it is therefore probable that some of the more risky clients 
remain unnoticed (type 1 error, false positive), because the actual creditworthiness is 
ignored in the rating. 
According to Miu and Ozdemir (2005), the correlation of credit risks under a 
PIT system should be much lower than under a TTC system. Therefore, default 
probability forecasts should be more precise (Rösch, 2004). 
It is probable that because the TTC rating does not necessarily reflect true 
credit risk, the attitude towards the ratings by both the business and the credit risk 
department are not positive, and that therefore the rating is not used in practice.   
 
Defaults per grade 
A main difference between PIT en TTC ratings is whether changes in the 
economic environment surrounding, borrowers are absorbed by rating migrations as in 
PIT, or are incorporated into changes in the actual default rate of each grade as in TTC 
(Bhatia, 2006). 
Under the PIT system, if the models were perfect, defaults actually 
experienced in each grade should match the prediction in each and every year. Under a 
TTC system, the observed annual default rate in each grade may be expected to vary 
from the long run average in accordance with movements in the cycle.  
 
Effort 
Trying to "look through the cycle" as a company's performance fluctuates is a 
challenge. It involves separating cyclical influences from those that are secular (i.e., 
longer-term trend) or seasonal, separating systematic (i.e., industry- or economy-wide) 
factors from those that are idiosyncratic (i.e., company specific) (Taylor, 2003). 
Therefore, a TTC rating requires more data and analysis than PIT grading.  
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Under the TTC approach, a downsize or stress scenario is estimated for the 
borrower and the rating is assigned based on the borrowers projected condition in the 
event the scenario occurs. The stress scenario used in the TTC rating approach is a 
deviation from the normal condition which is of a cyclical nature and which occurs 
with a certain probability over a predefined horizon. Permanent and cyclical 
components of default risk are typically not directly observable, but have to be 
estimated (Löffler, 2004). Besides, an institution putting in place a TTC approach has 
to handle differences in industries carefully. Different industries have different cycles, 
and when using the wrong cycle; the long-run PD value may not be relevant. All this 
means that the determination of a TTC rating requires complex (statistical) analyses.  
Complex analyses means that TTC grading entails greater expense, and for 
many middle market credits the extra expense might render such lending unprofitable 
for banks (Treaty and Carey, 2000). 
 
Validation 
Basel II requires that financial institutions validate their rating systems. 
Backtesting is part of the validation process and is the comparison of actual outcomes 
against predictions. Under a pure PIT system, the realised PDs will not deviate from 
the expected PDs, because all credit risk related information is incorporated in de 
rating. TTC ratings give an indication of the creditworthiness over a total economic 
cycle. The predicted TTC PDs will match the average realised PD during a total cycle. 
The more deviation between the predicted and the realised PD is, the more difficult 
the validation of the rating models. PIT PDs should be validated against the 12-month 
default rates, whereas TTC PDs against some kind of cycle average default rates (Miu 
and Ozdemir, 2005). Validation of a TTC system is therefore more complicated than 
of a PIT system. 
Another dimension of validation is testing whether the rating philosophy is 
realised in the rating systems. This analysis can be done by a rating migration analysis. 
The more PIT the ratings are, the higher the migration rate should be.  
Since rating philosophies applies to both PDs and default (or asset) 
correlations, the validation needs to be consistent with both PDs and their correlations. 
Any inconsistencies (such as PDs are intended to be PIT, whereas correlations are 
TTC) can distort the validation results (Miu and Ozdemir, 2005). 
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3.6 Hybrid 
Few financial institutions seem to clearly make a choice between PIT and TTC 
ratings. They seem to evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers over some period, for 
example, three to five years, indicating that their choice is somewhere between the 
above two types of ratings (Bank of Japan, 2005).  
The hybrid rating philosophy is the area between PIT and TTC. In a hybrid 
rating system, both the borrower’s current condition, outlook and cycle effects are 
included in the rating. Only substantial changes in the creditworthiness influence the 
rating. Short-term fluctuations, as included in the PIT rating are ignored. Ratings are 
not continuously reviewed, but on fixed moments in time. In a hybrid rating model, 
fluctuations in the economic or business cycles result in a combination of rating grade 
migration and changes in the level of default experienced in each grade (Financial 
Services Authority, 2005). Hybrid rating models can be close to PIT, TTC or 
somewhere in the middle. 
 
 
3.7 Rating horizon 
The rating horizon indicates on what time period the rating is based, see figure 
3. Basel II uses a rating horizon of one year; “the PD is the probability that a borrower 
meets the default definition within one year” (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006).  
PIT ratings are based on the expected developments of the creditworthiness of 
the client over a maximum of a year. A TTC rating looks forward through the cycle 
and takes the average PD over a complete cycle, to estimate a one-year PD. 
 
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
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3.8 Relevance of a rating philosophy 
The philosophical basis of a bank’s rating system is of key importance as it 
affects: 
 
• Rating volatility; 
• Internal rating model power and quality; 
• Pricing; 
• Early warning of defaults; 
• Calculations of expected and unexpected losses; 
• Regulatory and internal capital requirements; 
• Validation, backtesting and stress testing; 
• The competitive position of a bank. 
 
Though we cannot judge a priori which rating method is better than the other 
for certain banks, it is still very important for financial institutions to understand 
whether their own internal rating systems are more PIT-oriented, TTC-oriented, or 
follow a hybrid approach, in other words, what kind of information their ratings 
summarize.  
The optimal rating philosophy is determined by the rating objectives of the 
bank. The choice for a PIT or TTC rating philosophy is a trade-off between quality, 
timeliness and volatility. Whatever rating philosophy banks choose, to have a clear 
rating philosophy and to understand the consequences is very important because, when 
combined with the credit quality of individual obligors, it will determine the frequency 
of obligor rating changes in a changing economic environment (FED, 2006). 
Without knowing the rating philosophy, it is difficult either to interpret the 
results of backtesting of actual outcomes against predictions, or to assess what will 
happen to the capital requirements as the cycle fluctuates (Financial Services 
Authority, 2005).  
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4 SMES 
4.1 Definition of SMEs 
Financial institutions and banks have built many statistical models to measure 
the risk of their loan portfolio. However, no single type of model is suitable across all 
portfolios. Few attempts have been devoted to small commercial loans credit risk, 
although small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) exposures are a relatively high 
share of bank loan portfolios, especially in Europe. For OECD members, the 
percentage of SMEs out of the total number of firms is greater than 97% (Altman and 
Sabato, 2005). 
The definition of the business size: micro, small, medium, or large, results 
from the application of different criteria, such as the number of employees, the sales 
volume or the total assets.  
According to the guidelines of the European Commission (2001), the 
following subdivision can be made: 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
 
4.2 Characteristics of SMEs 
SME exposures have specific peculiarities. Several factors distinguish credit 
risk in small (SME) from large (corporate) commercial loan portfolios. These 
characteristics influence the relationship of the SME and the bank, the rating 
philosophy and therefore the credit risk modelling process. 
 
4.2.1 Information 
The most important characteristic defining small business finance is 
informational opacity. SME loans are illiquid and do not trade on secondary markets 
(Allen, Delong and Saunders, 2003). Small firms do not enter into contracts that are 
publicly visible or widely reported in the press. Contracts with suppliers and 
customers are generally kept private. In addition, small businesses do not issue traded 
securities that are continually priced in public markets.  
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SMEs are often managed by a very few directors who frequently own the total 
capital of the firm and aim to minimize the intrusion in their business rather than 
reaching an optimal debt target (Aybar-Arias, Casino-Martinez, López-Gracia, 2003).  
Accounting data appears only at discrete intervals, for SMEs in most cases 
only on a yearly basis. SMEs have in general lower quality accounting data than larger 
corporates. Many of the smallest firms do not have audited financial statements. As a 
result, small firms often cannot credibly convey their quality (Berger and Udell, 
1998). The data about SMEs are of unproven quality and therefore less reliable, and it 
can be a challenge to extract the minimum required information in order to improve 
the allocation of credit (Crouhy, Galai and Mark, 2001). 
On the contrary, the large corporate loan portfolio uses rich information 
concerning the financial situation of clients. This information comes from rating 
agencies and financial markets. In general, the information is available in time series, 
which allows trend analysis.  
Most PD models use market information, as bond data, equity price data or 
credit default swap data. This kind of information is not available for SMEs. This data 
limitation restricts the modelling choices. 
 
4.2.2 Economy 
SMEs are sensitive to the state the economy (Rijken, 2005). They may be 
expected to be more likely to fail, because they (1) are less likely to benefit from scale 
effects, (2) have less power in negotiations with financial and social partners, (3) are 
less likely to benefit from their experience or ‘learning effects’, compared to large 
firms, and (4) often operate on small markets.  
Due to the lack of product and market diversification, SMEs face high 
uncertainty about their future cash flow levels and timing. This leads to inconsistent 
and volatile financial statement data through time (Rijken, 2005). Financial data of 
one year can be totally inconsistent with the data of the next year.  
SMEs meet uncertainty and need to react quickly on events. The need to have 
financing available in order to seize unexpected market opportunities or to react to 
external shocks is particularly important for the vitality of SMEs (Rivaud-Danset, 
Dubocage and Salais, 1998). 
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4.2.3 Costs 
The relatively small size of each loan of a small commercial loan portfolio 
implies that the absolute size of the credit risk on any individual loan is minimal. 
Losses on any single loan will not cause the bank to become insolvent (Allen, Delong 
and Saunders, 2003). The cost per loan of determining the credit risk is often greater 
than the benefit in terms of loss avoidance, because it is time consuming and 
expensive to extensively evaluate a loan at its individual level (Dietsch and Petey, 
2002). Since lenders face fixed costs in lending, lending to small firms is by definition 
more expensive per dollar lent (Peterson, 1999). Therefore, methodological choices 
are restricted by time and cost constraints.  
 
4.2.4 Variation 
There is a large variation in the legal structure of small businesses (Bhatia, 
2006) and in the activities of SMEs. It is therefore difficult to attain homogeneity with 
small businesses as the size of the exposures, types of industry and the legal structure 
of obligors all vary substantially. It is however not possible, also due to financial 
constraints to develop different credit risk models for all types of SMEs.  
 
4.3 Characteristics of an SME PD model 
Because of the SME characteristics described above, it’s more difficult to 
develop an accurate PD model for SMEs, than for larger companies. The use of 
possible credit risk models and input variables is limited. Models developed for larger 
firms cannot be used for SMEs without adjustment. Default models based on public 
firm data and applied to (smaller) private firms will likely misrepresent actual default 
risk. 
20 
 
Besides the general credit risk model characteristics such as: powerful, 
accurate, statistically robust, reliable, intuitive, and transparent, a PD model for SMEs 
should have the following specific characteristics (Rikkers and Thibeault, 2006): 
 
• Time and cost efficient;         
• Fast; 
• Make use of the limited financial data available for SMEs;  
• Be able to work with only one year of financial data; 
• Broadly applicable. 
 
5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
5.1 Rating objectives 
The rating objectives determine the optimal rating philosophy. Rating are used 
for: 
1. Credit approval; 
2. Credit and portfolio monitoring; 
3. Early warning systems;  
4. Commercial activities; 
5. Pricing; 
6. Regulatory capital requirements; 
7. Economic capital requirements; 
8. Capital planning. 
 
For the first four roles, it's advantageous to have ratings that reflect the current 
creditworthiness of the counterparty in the current point in the cycle and thus on how 
the industry and economy are currently performing.  
In deciding whether to approve a new loan (1), it makes a difference whether 
the industry in question is nearer a peak or a trough of its cycle. This suggests a point-
in-time approach, whereby borrowers are regraded immediately as their fortunes 
change, whatever the cause may be (Taylor, 2003). In case of credit approval of a loan 
with a long maturity, TTC ratings give an indication of the ability of the obligor to 
meet his payments till the end of the term of the loan, which is important to know in 
the approval process.  
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For the second role, PIT grading has advantages as it indicates the current 
creditworthiness of counterparties. At the same time, the strategic issues involved 
make a longer-term viewpoint more appropriate; therefore at TTC rating might give 
some insights. TTC ratings can be used for budgeting purposes, human resource 
planning and provisions. 
For early warning, only a PIT rating is appropriate. TTC ratings cannot be used 
as an early warning system, because the rating does not reflect the current 
creditworthiness of the counterparty.  
Ratings are also used for commercial activities (4), for example cross-selling 
and marketing activities. In case a counterparty has an acceptable rating, the business 
can decide to actively contact this client to try to sell some other products or to expand 
current loans. It depends on the type of product and the life of the loan whether a PIT 
or TTC rating is more appropriate. 
In the case of pricing (point 5), both rating philosophies have advantages. The 
interest rate on debt can be divided in a risk free rate and the risk premium, where the 
latter is based on the creditworthiness of the counterparty. When using a PIT rating 
system, the risk premium matches exact with the credit risk of that counterparty at that 
moment. However, PIT ratings lead to volatile interest rates and not all banks are 
willing to adjust their prices that often, and not all counterparties will accept volatile 
interest rates. A TTC rating causes interest rates to be stable, but they do (in most 
cases) not reflect the true credit risk of the counterparty.  
The rating philosophy also influences the competitive position of banks. TTC 
ratings are on average somewhat higher than PIT ratings because they are stressed. 
PIT banks may therefore offer lower interest rates. There is a risk that banks using 
TTC ratings lose their clients during recovery, because PIT banks offer lower interest 
rates. The opposite happens during recessions. This is not a favourable situation. 
The rating philosophy can have significant implications for the cyclicality of 
banks’ regulatory and internal capital requirements (point 6 and 7). Research by 
Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson and Tsomocos (2003) shows that ratings based on TTC 
rating approaches lead to little, if any, increase in capital requirements for non-
defaulted assets in a recession, whereas ratings based on a PIT rating model lead to a 
40% to 50% increase.  
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Procyclicality is derived entirely from migration between grades, and is thus 
based on the ratings system being used by the bank. Procyclicality refers to the 
tendency for regulatory capital requirements to rise with downswings in the economy 
and to fall with upswings (Financial Services Authority, 2005).  
When using PIT ratings, the internal and regulatory capital requirements are 
becoming volatile and procyclical. PIT systems lead to higher capital requirements 
during recessions, which can lead to credit supply constraints as banks suffer capital 
shortages and they might perhaps even fail, which can worsen the economic situation. 
Substantial changes in capital requirements can increase the likelihood of a ‘credit 
crunch’. In addition, during recessions, capital available to meet regulatory and 
economic capital requirements becomes more scarce as banks make more provisions 
and write-offs.  
There is also the possibility that actions taken by individual firms to reduce 
their risk, e.g. by cutting back on lending will magnify the downturn by causing a 
credit crunch (Financial Services Authority, 2005). On the other hand, during the 
recovery and boom phases of the cycle, the PIT rating methodology gives the 
opportunity to grant extra loans, because the capital requirements are lower, and 
therefore stimulate the economy. Procyclical ratings can have macroeconomic 
consequences by encouraging overlending relative to risk in booms and reduction in 
lending during recessions (Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson and Tsomocos, 2003). 
The capital requirements under a TTC system are not influenced by the cycle, 
but because the ratings are stressed (based on the worst point in the cycle), the average 
capital requirements under a TTC system are expected to be higher than under a PIT 
system. However, because TTC ratings are very stable, capital requirements are stable 
and therefore, capital planning becomes easier. TTC ratings can be used to determine 
long-term resource allocation (both capital and human).  
 
Insert Figure 4 About Here 
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5.2 The banks portfolio 
Banks are always somewhere between a PIT and TTC rating. Whether they are 
close to PIT, TTC or are in the middle depends on several characteristics of the banks 
portfolio: 
 
• Firm size; 
• Industry; 
• Country; 
• Rating (PD); 
• Term of the loan; 
• Asset class (Basel II); 
• State of the economy. 
 
These characteristics influence the volatility and/or the rating horizon. The 
characteristics should be seen in combination with the rating objectives. 
 
Firm size, industry and country  
These three characteristics of the banks portfolio are very important for the 
determination of possible rating philosophies, because they influence the volatility of 
the counterparty. Different industries, firm sizes and countries have different 
volatilities. The more volatile a company, the shorter the rating horizon can be. 
(Geographical) diversification of the credit portfolio can reduce the impact of 
cyclicality of a portfolio. 
 
Rating (PD) 
The rating horizon is influenced by the current rating of a counterparty. The 
higher the probability of default, the shorter the rating horizon is. A financial 
institution wants a closer look on counterparty with a PD of 20%, than on a 
counterparty with a PD of 0.5%.   
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Term of the loan 
The choice between PIT and TTC ratings, or a mixture of the two depends also 
on the length of time financial institutions are exposed to the credit risk. Since the 
majority of a bank’s loans have a long time before maturity, it is desirable to assign a 
grade considering creditworthiness of the counterparty over the whole period. In case 
of a three months loan, it has no value to determine the TTC rating over a very long 
horizon. 
 
Asset class 
Basel II recognizes several asset classes: corporate, sovereign, bank, retail 
(residential mortgage, qualifying revolving retail exposures, retail other) and equity 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). The different asset classes require 
their own rating models, because each asset class has its own characteristics. Different 
asset classes have a different rating horizon and different volatilities.  
The rating horizon for equity is shorter, than he rating horizon for residential 
mortgages or sovereigns, due to differences in volatility and creditworthiness.  
 
State of the economy 
During a slowdown or a recession, the rating horizon is shorter, than during 
recovery and boom. During recessions, the credit risk of most counterparties is 
negatively influenced by the cycle. In order to prevent defaults and bankruptcy, banks 
tend to more often revise their ratings.  
 
5.3 The optimal rating philosophy for SMEs 
The following table gives an indication of the average asset volatility (standard 
deviation) in a year, of different industries and company sizes of a Dutch SME 
sample2. For the definition of micro, small and medium sized enterprises, see table 2. 
The table below indicates that there are differences in asset volatility between 
industries and company sizes.  
SMEs have in general more volatile activities than large corporates. According 
to paragraph 4.2, the smaller a company, the more vulnerable this company is to 
internal and external influences.  
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The sample shows that the smaller a company, the higher the asset volatility. 
Manufacturing and trade companies have smaller asset volatilities than service 
oriented companies. 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
The more volatile the company, the smaller the rating horizon can be. Because 
of the volatile nature of SMEs, a 100% TTC rating model cannot be used, because it is 
impossible to make a reliable analysis of the creditworthiness of an SME counterparty 
over a whole economic cycle of 10-15 years. This kind of analysis is only possible for 
very large corporates.  
The average credit risk of SMEs is higher than that of large corporates. SMEs 
are less likely to benefit from scale effects, have less power in negotiations with 
financial and social partners, are less likely to benefit from their experience or 
‘learning effects’, compared to large firms, and often operate on small markets. This 
makes SMEs more vulnerable than larger corporates.  
Under a TTC rating methodology, the rating horizon is that far away that the 
rating doesn’t give a right indication of true credit risk of SMEs. 
The determination of a TTC rating requires complex (statistical) analyses, 
because cyclical and permanent components in default risk need to be separated and 
the stress scenario needs to be simulated. This makes TTC ratings much more 
expensive than PIT or hybrid ratings. Because the revenues on SME loans are in 
general small, using a TTC rating philosophy is probably unprofitable for banks with 
an SME portfolio.   
Pure PIT rating systems however also have drawbacks. All information needs 
to be included in the rating; this requires a lot of effort from banks. Because the 
ratings become very volatile, both the interest rates and the capital requirements 
become very volatile and procyclical, which is not desirable. Besides, it is hard to take 
strategic decisions on volatile ratings. 
Based on the SME characteristics, we would advise to adopt a hybrid rating 
philosophy with a rating horizon between one and three years, based on the size, 
industry, life of the loan, and current creditworthiness of the counterparty. The more 
volatile, or the higher the credit risk, the smaller the rating horizon should be.  
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The rating objectives also should be taken into account when determining the 
optimal rating horizon.  
The rating should be revised, based on a revision schedule (once or twice a 
year), or when there is a significant change in the creditworthiness of a counterparty. 
In that case, the rating should be adjusted between times. It is advisable to assess the 
degree of credit risk under the economic downturn by use of a stress test. 
  
 
6 CONSEQUENCES OF THE HYBRID RATING PHILOSOPHY  
 
6.1 Rating volatility 
Under a hybrid rating philosophy, the ratings have an average volatility. The 
more often the ratings are revised, the more volatile they will be. However, they are 
not as volatile as under a PIT rating philosophy, since only substantial changes in the 
creditworthiness influence the rating. Short-term fluctuations, as taken into account in 
the PIT rating are ignored. 
 
Capital requirements 
The capital requirements are limited procyclical under a hybrid rating 
philosophy. Hybrid ratings do not significantly worsen the economic situation during 
recessions, which is the case with PIT ratings. PIT ratings can lead to a credit crunch 
during recessions. Since hybrid ratings are not stressed, the average capital 
requirements under a hybrid rating system are not significantly higher than under a 
PIT system, as is the case with TTC systems. Since hybrid ratings are reasonably 
stable, hybrid ratings can be used for (capital) planning purposes. 
 
Pricing 
 
The interest rates will give a true indication of credit risk, since all substantial 
credit risk factors are included in the rating, however they are not very volatile. Short 
time fluctuations are ignored. The interest rates under a hybrid rating system are not 
significantly higher than under PIT. The competitive position of the financial 
institution is therefore not negatively influenced, as is the case with a TTC rating 
methodology.  
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6.2 The ability to spot defaults ahead of time 
Under a hybrid rating model, all significant aspects of the current 
creditworthiness are included in the rating. Because transitory changes in the 
creditworthiness are ignored, the hybrid rating is not such a strong early warning 
system as a PIT rating model.  
 
6.3 Credit risk model development 
There are three main types of credit risk models, statistical models, hybrid 
models (models that combine expert knowledge and statistics) and expert judgement. 
The choice for a rating philosophy influences the type of credit risk model. A 
statistical model is in general more PIT, because the output is directly influenced by 
any change in the financials of a company. Expert judgement is more TTC. A hybrid 
rating philosophy in general matches best with a hybrid model. These models combine 
expert knowledge and statistics. Judgemental overrides of the rating are possible. 
The rating philosophy also influences variable choice. Quantitative variables 
are likely to more closely approximate a PIT system, to the extent that it's driven by 
current market information and/or the most recent financials. Qualitative variables like 
market outlook and management quality are more TTC. When having a hybrid model 
with a horizon between one and three years, the model should contain a combination 
of quantitative ‘PIT’ and qualitative ‘TTC’ variables.   
 
6.4 Validation 
Basel II requires financial institutions to validate their rating systems. The 
more PIT the rating system is, the easier validation. Backtesting is part of the 
validation process and is the comparison of actual outcomes against predictions. 
Under a hybrid rating system, the predicted defaults will slightly differ from the 
realised defaults. The more deviation between the predicted and the realised PD, the 
more difficult the validation of the rating models is. Validation of a hybrid rating 
model is somewhat more complex than of a PIT model.  
Another dimension of validation is testing whether the rating philosophy is 
realised in the rating systems. This analysis can be done by a rating migration analysis. 
The more PIT the ratings are, the higher the migration rate. Under a hybrid rating 
model, the migration rate is lower than under a PIT rating system.  
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A way to test the realisation of the rating philosophy is to develop a PIT 
statistical model, as a benchmark, and compare the ratings and the rating migration of 
both models.  
The validation process needs to be consistent with both the PDs and their 
correlations. Any inconsistencies (such as PDs are intended to be PIT, whereas 
correlations are TTC) can distort the validation results (Miu and Ozdemir, 2005).  
 
7 CONCLUSION 
This is the first paper that studies the considerations of financial institutions on 
what rating philosophy to adopt, in this case for an SME portfolio. SMEs have specific 
peculiarities that influence the rating philosophy and therefore the modelling of credit 
risk, as they are informationally opaque and volatile.  
A problem is that financial institutions nearly always neglect the first step in 
the rating model development process: the determination of the rating philosophy. It is 
very important for financial institutions to understand whether they want their internal 
rating systems to be point-in-time oriented (PIT), through-the-cycle (TTC) oriented, or 
follow a mixed approach, in other words the kind of information they want the rating 
to summarize. In PIT ratings, risks are evaluated based on the current condition of a 
firm regardless of the phase of the business cycle at the time of evaluation. TTC 
ratings indicate the ability of a firm to survive through the business and economic 
cycle.  
 
• The rating philosophy is of key importance as it affects: 
• Rating volatility; 
• Internal rating model power and quality; 
• Pricing; 
• Early warning of defaults; 
• Calculations of expected and unexpected losses; 
• Regulatory and internal capital requirements; 
• Validation, backtesting and stress testing; 
• The competitive position of a bank. 
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In this research, the concept rating philosophy is worked out, and the 
consequences of the different rating philosophies. Also, an overview is provided of the 
characteristics of SMEs that influence the rating philosophy. These specific SME 
characteristics are taken into account in the analysis to determine the optimal rating 
philosophy for SMEs.  
Based on the SME characteristics, we would advise to adopt a hybrid rating 
philosophy with a rating horizon between one and three years. The optimal rating 
horizon is based on the rating objectives and characteristics of the credit portfolio. 
 
 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Bank and financial institution are used interchangeably throughout this 
research.  
2
  The analysis is based on annual changes in book values of assets of a sample 
of 320 Dutch SMEs. Extreme individual asset volatilities (above 100%) are ignored 
(13 of the 527 cases).  
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FIGURE 1 
 
The credit risk modelling process 
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FIGURE 2 
The influence of the cycle on the ratings 
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TABLE 1 
Type I and II errors  
                    Estimated 
Observed Non-default Default 
Non-default True Type II error 
Default Type I error Hit 
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FIGURE 3 
 
The rating horizon 
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TABLE 2 
 
The subdivision of business size 
 
Business size Number of employees Annual turnover Balance sheet total 
Large > 250 > € 50 mln > € 43 mln 
Medium >50 - ≤ 250 > 10 - ≤ € 50 mln >10 - ≤ € 43 mln 
Small  ≥10 - ≤ 50 ≥ 2 - ≤ € 10 mln ≥ 2 - ≤ € 10 mln 
Micro < 10 < € 2 mln < € 2 mln 
SME ≤ 250 ≤ 50 mln ≤ 43 mln 
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FIGURE 4 
The influence of the cycle on the capital requirements 
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TABLE 3 
 
The asset volatility of different company sizes and industries 
Industry Asset volatility    Size Asset volatility  
Manufacturing 17.74%   Micro 22.33% 
Trade 15.49%   Small 16.14% 
Service 22.82%   Medium 13.75% 
 
 
